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TURKMEN v. HASTY: THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
HOLDS HIGHEST RANKING LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE 
FOR POST-9/11 POLICIES INFRINGING ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Abstract: On June 17, 2015, in Turkmen v. Hasty, the Second Circuit of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed in part the order of the U.S. District Court for 
the District of New York. This order denied motions to dismiss due process and 
equal protection claims for damages against federal officials, a cause of action 
created by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (“Bivens”). The claims in Turkmen arose from 
the detainment and treatment of men perceived to be “Arab or Muslim” after 
9/11. This Comment argues that the Second Circuit properly decided this case 
per the Bivens test without extending Bivens into a new context. This Comment 
also asserts that national security does not justify limitations on the constitution-
al obligations of federal officials toward those in their care. Last, this Comment 
argues that qualified immunity should be limited for Bivens claims regarding 
national security actions. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 17, 2015, in Turkmen v. Hasty, the Second Circuit of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs who were detained post-9/11 based on a 
federal policy of detaining “Arab and Muslim” men had plausibly pleaded 
their complaint that the defendants, former federal officials, had violated the 
Constitution.1 Plaintiffs had brought claims against these federal officials for 
damages using the cause of action created in 1971 by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(“Bivens”).2 These claims were based on alleged violation of the plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process, equal protection, and Fourth Amendment rights dur-
ing their confinement in a federal facility.3 The Second Circuit relied on the 
Bivens test stated in 2009 by the Second Circuit in Arar v. Ashcroft and con-
cluded that the claim for damages could be extended in this context.4 The 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 225, 227, 241–42, 264 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 2 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971); Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 265. 
 3 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 265. 
 4 See id. at 234; Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571–72 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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Bivens test requires the court to first determine if the claim is bringing Bivens 
into a “new context” and second if there is “another remedy, equally effec-
tive” or if there are “special factors counseling hesitation” against a judicial 
remedy.5 The court in Turkmen reasoned that the context of conditions of 
confinement claims against individual officers for harsh detainment condi-
tions has precedent within the Bivens jurisprudence.6 
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit properly applied the two-
part test articulated by Arar by recognizing that Turkmen does not bring 
Bivens into a “new context.”7 The court also properly avoided using the “spe-
cial factors counseling hesitation” to justify limiting Bivens in the national 
security context.8 Part I of this Comment discusses the history of Bivens 
claims and qualified immunity, as well as the procedural history and historical 
context of Turkmen.9 Part II details the Bivens and qualified immunity anal-
yses of Turkmen by comparing the majority and dissent opinions on several 
relevant issues.10 Part III argues that Turkmen does not extend the Bivens 
remedy to a new context and that, in national security cases, the application of 
Bivens and the pullback of qualified immunity is justified.11 
I. THE HISTORY OF BIVENS CLAIMS IN THE CONTEXT OF 9/11 IN  
DECIDING TURKMEN V. HASTY 
In 1971, in Bivens, the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized an implied 
right to sue federal officials for money damages for a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.12 The Court rejected the U.S. government’s argument that the 
plaintiff could only sue for damages under tort law because there may be dis-
parities between Fourth Amendment interests and tort law interests.13 The 
Court determined that a money damages remedy for a constitutional violation 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97; Arar, 585 F.3d at 571–72. 
 6 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 235. 
 7 See id. at 234–35 (quoting Arar, 585 F.3d at 572). 
 8 See id. at 237 n.17; Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 255, 277 (2010) (discussing why other doctrines will do the work to protect the 
exercise of federal discretion in national security cases and why Bivens remedies should extend to 
national security cases). 
 9 See infra notes 12–57 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 58–91 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 92–125 and accompanying text. 
 12 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. The courts were given the onus whether or not to provide a 
damages remedy for alleged constitutional violations by federal officials similar to the statutory 
remedy provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for claims against officials at the state and local level. See 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1126 (2014) (discussing why there have been such strong limitations on 
Bivens damages by the courts in the national security and foreign relations context). 
 13 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390–95; see also Kent, supra note 12, at 1139 (explaining that the 
Court in Bivens refused to allow state law to serve as the sole relief for the plaintiff because the 
Fourth Amendment covers a wider breadth of interests than state law). 
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would be proper because the Court had previously implied injunctive relief 
against federal officials for constitutional and statutory claims.14 The Court 
included in its decision two limitations to the right to sue federal officials for 
money damages: if there was “another remedy, equally effective” or if there 
were “special factors counseling hesitation” against a judicial remedy.15 The 
Court later extended Bivens to suits against federal officials under the Fifth 
Amendment and the Eighth Amendment.16 Thus, the Bivens action was creat-
ed.17 
In the past, the U.S. Supreme Court has “refused to extend Bivens liabil-
ity to any new context or new category of defendants.”18 The reason for this 
reticence is a concern about separation of powers.19 Deciding whether to ex-
tend Bivens focuses on whether Congress or the judiciary should create this 
remedy, with the U.S. Supreme Court traditionally favoring Congress’s dis-
cretion.20 In 2015, in Turkmen v. Hasty, the Second Circuit became the first 
court to allow a Bivens action against highly-placed executive officials for 
their official policies in reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attack, specifically Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller.21 Section A of 
this Part focuses on the history of Bivens claims and the requirements for the 
defense of qualified immunity to such claims.22 Section B focuses on the pro-
cedural history of the Turkmen decision.23 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–96. 
 15 Id. at 396–97. 
 16 See Kelly Dougherty, Note, The Circuit Split Created by Pollard v. Geo Group, Inc.: The 
Dangers of Allowing a Bivens Action Where Adequate Alternative State Remedies Exist, 9 RUT-
GERS J.L. & PUB POL’Y 665, 668 (2012) (examining the history and changes in Bivens jurispru-
dence). 
 17 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (holding that, in the absence of an affirmative congressional 
statement to the contrary, a petitioner can state a cause of action and recover damages for injuries 
caused by federal officials’ violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 18 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 267 (Raggi, J., dissenting) (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (holding that a plaintiff cannot bring a Bivens claim against a 
private entity acting in a federal capacity)). 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. This favoring of a potential legislative remedy is based on the notion that Congress 
is better equipped to determine the consequences of new litigation on public officials than the 
courts. See id. (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983) (holding that Congress is more 
able than the judiciary to determine how new litigation between federal employees will impact the 
government because of Congress’s experience and investigative capabilities)). 
 21 Id. at 265. 
 22 See infra notes 24–44 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text. 
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A. Bivens and Qualified Immunity: Accountability for Federal Policy 
Infringing on Constitutional Rights, Up to a Point 
Prior to the creation of the Bivens action, no remedy existed for in-
fringements of a citizen’s constitutional rights by federal government offi-
cials.24 In 1971, in Bivens, the U.S. Supreme Court first implied private dam-
ages actions against federal officials for alleged violations of a citizen’s con-
stitutional rights.25 Under Bivens, federal officials could be sued individually 
rather than as officials of the federal government.26 The last time the Court 
extended Bivens liability was 1980.27 The Second Circuit has stated that 
Bivens liability should be very limitedly applied in “new contexts.”28 
There is a two-step process for determining whether a Bivens claim is 
available to a plaintiff.29 First, a court must determine whether the underlying 
claim “would extend Bivens to a new context.”30 If the answer to the first 
question is yes, then the court must consider whether there is an alternative 
remedy available to the plaintiff or whether “special factors counsel hesita-
tion.”31 
Bivens liability has rarely been granted by the courts, but it offers a val-
uable tool in the court’s discretion to hold federal officials responsible for 
breaches of constitutional rights.32 In 1980, in Carlson v. Green, the U.S. Su-
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Dougherty, supra note 16, at 667 (describing the lack of a claim to assign liability to 
federal officials for violations of the Constitution that injured citizens prior to 1971). 42 U.S.C 
§ 1983 allowed claims to enforce such constitutional infringements against states only. Id. at 666–
67. 
 25 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (implying action for unlawful arrest and excessive force in 
arrest under Fourth Amendment unreasonable searches and seizures prohibition). On its face, the 
1971 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics appears to express a fundamental belief about liberty, which was articulated by Chief 
Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison in 1803: “The very essence of civil liberty certainly con-
sists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury.” George D. Brown, Counter-Counter Terrorism via Lawsuit—The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 841, 845 (2009) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)). 
 26 See Kent, supra note 12, at 1140 (describing why allowing suits against federal officials as 
individuals is preferable because, although victims of federal officials’ violations could sue the 
United States government directly, sovereign immunity would likely block their relief). 
 27 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980) (implying claim under Eighth Amendment 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause for failing to see to prisoner’s medical needs). The only 
other Supreme Court extension of Bivens was in 1979. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 
(1979) (implying Bivens claim under the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause for gender 
discrimination by a U.S. congressman against his employee). 
 28 See Arar, 585 F.3d at 571 (clarifying the limited two-step Bivens analysis). 
 29 See id. at 572. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)). 
 32 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 233–34; id. at 267 (Raggi, J., dissenting); Frederick Schauer, 
Constitutionalism and Coercion, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1881, 1903–04 (2013) (arguing for the necessity 
of constitutional coercion in the form of Bivens remedies to hold officials in the executive branch 
accountable to constitutional provisions). 
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preme Court last extended the Bivens action.33 Although the Court found both 
that the claims extended Bivens into the “new context” of the Eighth 
Amendment and that the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provided an al-
ternative remedy, a Bivens remedy still applied.34 The Court reasoned that the 
Bivens remedy more effectively protected the plaintiff’s rights than the FTCA 
remedy.35 The Court concluded that, unlike an FTCA remedy, a Bivens reme-
dy was a deterrent because it held individual employees liable instead of the 
government, offered punitive damages, allowed a plaintiff to opt for a jury, 
and was not dependent on the discretion of an individual state.36 
In order to avoid unnecessary Bivens liability when working in their of-
ficial capacities, federal officials may receive qualified immunity from liabil-
ity.37 A defendant can utilize the protections of qualified immunity if the 
complaint does not sufficiently plead that the defendant’s actions violated the 
plaintiff’s rights or if, at the time of the violation, the defendant would not 
have known that the right existed because it was not clear.38 
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal held that a federal 
official’s constitutional liability cannot be based on vicarious liability alone to 
overcome qualified immunity.39 Instead, plaintiffs must plausibly plead that 
each defendant federal official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20. 
 34 See id. at 19–20 (alleging that federal prison officials violated the plaintiff’s son’s Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the officials were responsible for the injuries 
the son sustained in prison, which caused his death). 
 35 Id. at 20. 
 36 See id. at 21–23. There also was a lack of “special factors counseling hesitation” and no 
congressional legislative history that suggested that Congress intended to prohibit plaintiffs from a 
Bivens remedy when a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) remedy was available. See id. at 19. 
 37 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 280–81 (Raggi, J., dissenting). Qualified immunity exceeds the 
reach of a mere defense and allows a defendant to avoid litigation entirely in applicable contexts. 
See Kent, supra note 12, at 1141 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009)). The quali-
fied immunity doctrine serves, in part, to protect officials by allowing them to properly do their 
jobs for the public without fear of litigation against them. See id. Critics of the qualified immunity 
doctrine allege that it has been inconsistently applied by the Supreme Court, reflecting a high 
degree of legal maneuvering based on policy determinations. See David Rudovsky, The Qualified 
Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional 
Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 35–36 (1989) (examining the impact of qualified immunity litiga-
tion on civil rights claims). Thus, the Court often draws the contours of the qualified immunity 
doctrine based on policy determinations as to the government’s interests. See id. 
 38 See Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the officers who con-
ducted a required strip search of the son of a prison inmate were entitled to qualified immunity 
even if their duty was discretionary). Generally, this determination is based on the reasonableness 
of the officials’ conduct in the circumstances and at the time that the conduct occurred. Id.; see 
also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 
(1999)) (holding that the petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was 
not necessarily unconstitutional when the search occurred). 
 39 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77. 
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themselves.40 The decision placed a higher burden on the plaintiff to show 
that the defendant purposefully condoned or agreed to a subordinate’s uncon-
stitutional actions.41 Before Iqbal, if the supervisory defendant was involved 
in the misconduct at issue, the theory of respondeat superior applied liability 
to them in Bivens claims.42 After Iqbal, a plaintiff’s due process and equal 
protection claims required proof that each defendant possessed the intent to 
punish or discriminate against the plaintiff through his or her own actions.43 
Seemingly, this made it harder for plaintiffs to overcome defendants’ quali-
fied immunity.44 
B. Turkmen v. Hasty: Unique in a Contentious Post-9/11 Climate 
The plaintiffs in Turkmen v. Hasty first brought their claims against the 
defendants, five federal law enforcement officials, over thirteen years ago.45 
After 9/11, the FBI and other agencies within the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) initiated an investigation aimed at identifying the perpetrators of the 
attack.46 This investigation included a policy whereby any resident who was 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See id. 
 41 See id. at 682–83; see also Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 233. 
 42 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 250. 
 43 See id. at 233; id. at 275 (Raggi, J. dissenting); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 
(1979) (evaluating whether the conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees violated the Due 
Process Clause, either through evidence of explicit punitive intent or the lack of a rationally relat-
ed alternative purpose for the condition); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1976) 
(holding that courts may infer an intent to discriminate on the basis of race from a statute in order 
to support a finding of an Equal Protection Clause violation). In Bell v. Wolfish in 1979, the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered a suit brought by pretrial detainees who challenged the constitutionality 
of the conditions of their confinement in a federally operated, short-term custodial facility. See 
441 U.S. at 523. Conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees are unconstitutional under the 
Due Process Clause when the detainee’s conditions become so punitive so as to undermine the 
detainee’s liberty interest. See id. On the one hand, a particular condition is not punishment if it is 
reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose, unless the requisite punitive intent exists. 
See id. at 538–39. On the other hand, the condition may not be “arbitrary or purposeless” or a 
court may make an inference that the actual purpose of the condition is unconstitutional punish-
ment. Id. at 539. In Washington v. Davis in 1976, the Supreme Court held that proof that a law 
impacts one race to a much greater degree than another does not make that law per se unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause. See 426 U.S. at 242. Although disproportionate impact is 
relevant, discriminatory intent must be demonstrated as well in order to trigger strict scrutiny, 
which is traditionally applied to laws that discriminate on the basis of race. See id. Thus, in Wash-
ington, the Court held that proof of discriminatory purpose is necessary for an equal protection 
violation to be shown. See id. at 245. 
 44 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 250 (requiring Bivens plaintiffs to prove that defendants’ own 
misconduct meets each of the requirements of the constitutional violation, element by element, to 
hold them liable). 
 45 See id. at 224. 
 46 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAIN-
EES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNEC-
TION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1, 11–12 (2003), https://www.
oig.justice.gov/special/0306/index.htm [https://perma.cc/37ED-AJ6E]. 
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perceived to be “Arab or Muslim,” and discovered in violation of his or her 
visa, was arrested and held until affirmatively cleared.47 While confined un-
der this policy, the plaintiffs suffered from harsh conditions, including fre-
quent strip searches, meager food, denial of basic hygiene items, physical and 
verbal abuse, and were held indefinitely, often with no suspected links to ter-
rorism.48 The defendants received daily reports of the arrests and detentions 
and some determined how to exert the most pressure possible on the detain-
ees.49 Most of the plaintiffs were held in the Administrative Maximum Spe-
cial Housing Unit (“ADMAX SHU”) of the Metropolitan Detention Center 
(“MDC”), a particularly restrictive unit.50 
In 2006, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York dismissed the plaintiffs’ unlawful-length-of-detention claims but permit-
ted the substantive due process and equal protection claims to continue.51 Six 
of the original eight plaintiffs then settled their claims against the government 
and Iqbal was decided, which changed the pleading requirements for the 
plaintiffs’ case.52 The Second Circuit then vacated and remanded the condi-
tions of confinement claims for further consideration.53 Later, six additional 
plaintiffs intervened and the plaintiffs amended their complaint.54 The Bivens 
claims included a due process conditions of confinement claim, an equal pro-
tection claim alleging that the plaintiffs faced such conditions due to their 
perceived “race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin,” and a Fourth and Fifth 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See Fourth Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶¶ 1, 39–49, Turkmen v. Ash-
croft, 915 F. Supp. 2d 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 02 CV 2307); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 46, at 14, 37–39. 
 48 See Fourth Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 47, ¶¶ 119, 120, 
128, 130; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON 
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CEN-
TER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 1, 33–35 (2003), https://oig.justice.gov/special/0312/final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/22PB-6E9Z]. For example, an agent from the FBI came to arrest Anser 
Mehmood’s wife but arrested him based on a minor immigration violation only, stating he would 
be out on bail within days, but he was instead held for months in harsh conditions. See Fourth 
Amended Complaint and Request for Jury Trial, supra note 47, ¶¶ 159–172. 
 49 See Fourth Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 47, ¶ 61. 
 50 See id. ¶¶ 4, 67, 76. 
 51 Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 224–25 (citing Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307 (JG), 2006 
WL 1662663, at *33–36, 40–41 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 589 F.3d 
542 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). 
 52 See id. at 225; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (requiring a complaint to state a facially 
plausible cause of action, beyond a mere probability, to satisfy the inference that the defendant 
purposefully discriminated against the plaintiff). 
 53 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 225; see also Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546–47 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (holding that the conditions of confinement claims should be remanded in order for the 
court to apply the new Iqbal pleading standard). 
 54 Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 225. This included a class of other non-citizens who were arrested 
and detained after September 11, 2001, and were perceived by the defendants to be Arab or Mus-
lim. Id. 
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Amendment claim based on the unreasonable and punitive strip searches the 
plaintiffs faced.55 Ultimately, the Second Circuit upheld most of the claims.56 
The court denied qualified immunity to the federal officials on most of the 
claims, holding that qualified immunity did not apply because pretrial detain-
ees had constitutional rights no matter the circumstances.57 
II. A COMPARISON OF THE BIVENS DOCTRINE AND QUALIFIED  
IMMUNITY THROUGH TURKMEN V. HASTY 
In 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Turkmen v. Hasty al-
lowed for an extension of Bivens liability, which is unprecedented in chal-
lenges to post-9/11 detention policies.58 This facially conflicted with the deci-
sion by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal in 2009, which denied a 
Bivens remedy for a claim based on similar post-9/11 detainment policies.59 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. Although critics argue that this litigation is sometimes merely a means of calling atten-
tion to personal politics against counter-terrorist policies, many of these plaintiffs suffered real 
injuries of the sort at which Bivens is aimed to remedy. See Brown, supra note 25, at 874. 
 56 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 265. 
 57 See id. at 224, 247, 259, 262–63; id. at 265 (Raggi, J., dissenting); see also Iqbal v. Hasty, 
490 F.3d 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the exigent circumstances post-9/11 did not dimin-
ish detainee’s right not to be needlessly harassed and mistreated in a prison cell), rev’d sub nom. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (determining that the respondent failed to plausibly plead facts to 
support a claim for purposeful discrimination against the detainees). Qualified immunity was 
denied in part because it was clearly established at the time of the plaintiffs’ detention that it was 
illegal to impose punitive conditions of confinement on pretrial detainees, to hold individuals in 
harsh conditions of confinement due to their “race, ethnicity, religion, and/or national origin,” to 
continuously subject detainees to unnecessary strip and body cavity searches, or to conspire to 
deprive detainees of equal protection of the law. See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 251, 259, 261–62, 264. 
This illegality exists because there is no rational relationship between the harsh conditions that the 
detainees suffered and a legitimate government purpose. See id. at 251, 261–62, 264. 
 58 See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 265 (2d Cir. 2015) (Raggi, J., dissenting). The 
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals have not extended a Bivens remedy 
for post-9/11 policies undertaken by federal officials in the interest of national security. See id. at 
265 n.1 (citing Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203 (7th Cir. 2012); Mirmehdi v. United States, 
689 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 556 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
 59 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666–67, 687 (2009). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, decided by the 
Supreme Court in 2009, concerned a plaintiff who was arrested by agents of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service due to the suspected fraud of identification documents. Id. The plaintiff 
was held in the Metropolitan Detention Center under maximum security conditions in the Admin-
istrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (“ADMAX SHU”) because he was designated a person 
of “high interest” to the 9/11 investigation. Id. His causes of action arose from his harsh treatment 
in the ADMAX SHU. Id. at 667. The complaint contended that the designation of “high interest” 
undermined his First and Fifth Amendment rights because the designation was established based 
on his “race, religion, or national origin.” See id. at 668–69. The complaint also alleged that the 
defendants condoned the plaintiff’s harsh treatment as a policy judgment based solely on the 
plaintiff’s “religion, race, or national origin.” See id. The Court held that Bivens defendants are 
liable only if their actions satisfy each element of the underlying constitutional tort, which the 
Court held that they had not. See id. at 676–77. Iqbal involved many of the same defendants as 
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Furthermore, Iqbal favored granting qualified immunity to government offi-
cials in the national security context, but Turkmen pulled back on the quali-
fied immunity doctrine.60 Relying in part on Ashcroft, the dissent in Turkmen 
stated that the Bivens remedy should not be granted because it brought Bivens 
into a “new context” and included special factors counseling hesitation in 
applying this judicial remedy.61 The commentary provided by the dissent pre-
sents a question as to why a Bivens remedy has been extended in this case, 
when it has never before been permitted to challenge federal officials’ post-
9/11 responses.62 
First, the court in Turkmen evaluated whether the claim brought the 
Bivens remedy into a “new context.63 Under this first step, it can be difficult 
to determine what constitutes a “new context.”64 In Turkmen, the majority 
noted that the context of the case is not the national response in the wake of 
9/11, but the context of the plaintiffs facing punitive conditions while detain-
ees in a federal facility.65 This context was determined by the court by analyz-
ing the constitutional “rights injured,” due process and equal protection 
rights, in conjunction with the “mechanism of injury,” the punitive prison 
conditions.66 The court held that the constitutional claims in this case were 
                                                                                                                           
Turkmen v. Hasty, the Second Circuit case from 2015, including John Ashcroft, the former Attor-
ney General, and Robert Mueller, the former Director of the FBI. Id. at 666; Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 
224. In Iqbal, the Court attempted to balance the right of an individual to actual and symbolic 
damages for a constitutional injury with allowing federal officers discretion, ultimately toward 
deference to the officials. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. 
CT. REV. 225, 261 (arguing that the national security exceptionalism justification in post-9/11 
emergency detention cases is overstated and judicial responses are more varied). 
 60 Chad Howell, Qualified Discovery: How Ashcroft v. Iqbal Endangers Discovery When 
Civil Rights Plaintiffs File Suit Against Government Officials, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 299, 
311 (2011) (arguing that after Iqbal the judicial remedies available to those facing constitutional 
violations by government officials will be more limited). For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ 2012 decision in Padilla v. Yoo essentially created an exception to the principles embod-
ied in Bivens by granting the government official qualified immunity. See 678 F.3d 748, 762, 768–
69 (2012) (holding that an American citizen detained as an enemy combatant under harsh condi-
tions for national security interests could not prove a violation of clearly established law, and, as 
such, the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity); see also Jonathan Hafetz, Torture, and 
Impunity in U.S. Courts, AL-JAZEERA (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2012/01/20121307159326319.html [https://perma.cc/J2TP-PX45] (discussing how Padilla 
threatens constitutional rights and liberties as well as the accountability of government actors). 
Padilla provided the potential for immunity from governmental abuse in the name of national 
security. See Hafetz, supra. 
 61 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 265, 267, 272 (Raggi, J., dissenting). 
 62 See id. at 272. 
 63 See id. at 234 (majority opinion); id. at 267 (Raggi, J., dissenting) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 
462 U.S. 367, 377–78 (1983)). 
 64 See id. at 234 (majority opinion). 
 65 Id. at 234–35. 
 66 Id. This finding is based on the calculus used to determine the context of the claim in the 
2009 Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Arar v. Ashcroft, in which the court refused to 
extend the Bivens remedy. See id. at 234; Arar, 585 F.3d at 572. In Arar, after determining that the 
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not in a new Bivens context, but fit into the previous context for conditions of 
confinement cases.67 Conversely, the dissent in Turkmen argued that the con-
text of the case was the national security response in the period post-9/11, 
when concerns were especially high and decisive action was warranted.68 The 
dissent argued that, looking at all of the legal and factual circumstances, there 
was no similar precedent on point.69 The dissent stated that the majority in-
correctly applied a high level of generality to the inquiry and equated the 
claims at issue to previous Bivens precedent in which federal prisoners were 
permitted to bring actions for indifference to their medical needs.70 The dis-
sent claimed that the claim for punitive conditions of confinement of pre-trial 
detainees in a time of national security crisis was a “new context” requiring 
the full Bivens analysis.71 The majority disagreed and held that the national 
security policies after 9/11 did not constitute the “context” of the claim and 
that instead this confused the first step of the Bivens test with the second.72 
Second, the Second Circuit looked at whether the claim brought up 
“special factors counseling hesitation” or whether alternative remedies were 
available to plaintiffs.73 In Turkmen, the majority did not address the “special 
factors” or the alternative remedies because it held that the claim did not 
bring Bivens into a “new context,” the first step in the Bivens inquiry.74 The 
dissent in Turkmen argued against applying Bivens to the claim because of 
four “special factors:” the fact that the plaintiffs confronted an official execu-
tive policy, that the claim infringed on the executive’s immigration authority 
and national security authority, and that Congress had discretion to provide a 
statutory damages remedy, which they did not.75 The dissent argued that the 
                                                                                                                           
case brought the Bivens jurisprudence into a “new context,” the Second Circuit then evaluated the 
policy concerns of the case, “special factors,” and alternative remedies to determine if a Bivens 
claim was justified. Arar, 585 F.3d at 572; see Turkmen, 289 F.3d at 234. 
 67 Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 235. Additionally, in Turkmen, the Second Circuit held that detainees 
had similar rights as citizens to be free from punitive confinement, so the case was not in a new 
context from other conditions of confinement cases. See id. at 236. Similarly, in Carlson v. Green 
in 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court created an Eighth Amendment Bivens action for the harsh treat-
ment of prisoners. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–20 (1979); Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 236. Addi-
tionally, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko in 2001, the Court held there was insufficient 
cause to create a Bivens remedy for the treatment of private corporations who were holding federal 
detainees; the plaintiffs were not federal prisoners suing a federal official, which could have justi-
fied Bivens protections. See Corr. Servs. Corp v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71–72 (2001); Turkmen, 
289 F.3d at 235. 
 68 See Turkmen, 289 F.3d at 268 (Raggi, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority unduly nar-
rows the definition of context). 
 69 See id. at 269–70. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. at 268–70. 
 72 See id. at 234 (majority opinion). 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. at 237 n.17. 
 75 Id. at 272 (Raggi, J., dissenting). 
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Bivens remedy should not be used to challenge executive policy, in this case 
the official confinement policy undertaken by highly ranked federal officials 
in response to the threat created.76 
The majority and dissent also disagreed about whether the plaintiffs had 
plausibly pleaded their due process and equal protection claims.77 In order to 
bring a claim of due process or equal protection, the plaintiffs had to prove 
that the defendants had the specific intent to punish or discriminate against 
them through harsh detainment conditions.78 The majority inferred both puni-
tive intent and discriminatory intent from the actions of the defendants.79 The 
plaintiffs showed that the defendants directed their detainment, even if the 
plaintiffs were not suspected of terrorism, and placed them in extremely re-
strictive conditions, which were normally reserved for suspected terrorists.80 
This unnecessary restriction served no legitimate purpose.81 The dissent ar-
gued that the majority mistakenly implied the defendants’ intent to punish or 
discriminate by stating that the confinement policy was not related to a legit-
imate goal.82 To the dissent, the legitimate goal was national security.83 In 
response, the majority stated that national security concerns do not justify 
detaining pre-trial individuals in such harsh conditions on the basis of per-
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. (citing Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74). 
 77 See id. at 245–46, 248–49, 252–53, 256 (majority opinion). 
 78 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–42 
(1976); Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 233, 244, 252. Intent to punish or discriminate may be express or 
implied. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that claim by 
black residents based on their relationship with police did not meet the requisite factual basis for 
showing discriminatory intent under the Equal Protection Clause). To show the requisite intent in 
such discrimination cases, the plaintiff can point to a law that creates an explicit classification of 
people based on race. See id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213, 227–
29 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to all governmentally-created racial classifications)). 
Alternatively, to show discriminatory intent, a plaintiff can demonstrate that a law, which is facial-
ly neutral, is intentionally discriminatory when applied. See id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (holding that a city cannot use a racially discriminatory means to enforce 
an ordinance)). Last, a plaintiff can allege that a neutral policy has a negative consequence in 
practice and was motivated by discriminatory intent. See id. (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977) (holding that that a plaintiff had failed to 
carry its burden of proving that local authorities’ refusal to rezone a tract showed racially discrim-
inatory intent); Johnson v. Wing, 178 F.3d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a corporation 
charging a homeless, disabled plaintiff for the use of its facility, even though it swallowed most of 
her social security benefits, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause)). 
 79 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 245–46, 248–49, 252–53, 256. 
 80 See id. at 255–56. Two defendants also approved a false statement that the detainees had 
been classified as “high security” based on individual assessments of their behavior and past histo-
ry of terrorism. Id. at 256. In fact, no such assessments were made. Id. 
 81 See id. at 248–49. 
 82 Id. at 275 (Raggi, J., dissenting). 
 83 See id. 
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ceived race or religion, so the plaintiffs had plausibly pleaded their constitu-
tional claims.84 
Last, the qualified immunity doctrine at issue immunizes public officials 
from damages liability when the conduct for which they are being sued did 
not “violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.”85 The majority held that the situation presented by 9/11 did not 
justify qualified immunity for the due process claim, because the plaintiffs 
plausibly pleaded their due process claim and this right was established at the 
time of confinement.86 Furthermore, the majority held that qualified immuni-
ty did not apply to the equal protection claim because the plaintiffs had plau-
sibly pleaded their equal protection claim and this right was also established 
at the time of confinement.87 The restrictive confinement and mistreatment of 
the plaintiffs based on their “race, ethnicity, religion, and/or national origin” 
was illegal at the time of the detainment, such that any “reasonably competent 
officer” would understand the illegality of such actions.88 Conversely, the 
dissent argued that the defendants should have been granted qualified immun-
ity because it serves as a protection to government officials in their official 
duties.89 The dissent argued that the defendants took quick, decisive action in 
a time of need in order to protect the nation from further attacks and did not 
defy “established law.”90 The dissent argued that that the majority was overly 
general in its definition of “established law” and incorrectly denied qualified 
immunity.91 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. at 245, 264 (majority opinion). 
 85 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (holding officers who entered arrestee’s house without warrant were shield-
ed by qualified immunity because they did not violate “clearly established” rights); Procunier v. 
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (holding that qualified immunity should not have been reject-
ed because the petitioners could not have reasonably known about a right that had not yet been 
“clearly established”); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (holding that school board 
member was only liable if he, in bad faith, ignored student’s “clearly established” rights). Quali-
fied immunity is an affirmative defense, which must be pled by the defendant. See Malesko, 534 
U.S. at 69. 
 86 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 246–47 (stating that pretrial detainees have a right to be free from 
punitive conditions, regardless of the circumstances). 
 87 See id. at 259 (stating that illegally detaining the plaintiffs in the challenged conditions 
because of their race, ethnicity, religion, and/or national origin violated their equal protection 
rights). 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. at 281 (Raggi, J., dissenting). 
 90 See id. 
 91 See id. 
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III. TURKMEN V. HASTY: EXTENDING BIVENS WITHOUT INFRINGING ON 
NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 
This Part argues that the Second Circuit correctly decided Turkmen v. 
Hasty in 2015.92 First, it analyzes why Turkmen does not constitute a new 
context for Bivens claims.93 Second, it analyzes why national security is an 
insufficient “special factor” for limiting Bivens.94 Last, this Part explains why 
qualified immunity is an overly permissive defense to Bivens claims and 
should not apply in the national security context.95 
Supreme Court precedent proves that conditions of confinement claims 
in federal prisons, such as the claim in Turkmen, fall squarely within the con-
text of previous Bivens liability, not within a new context.96 The first step of 
the Bivens calculus is whether the Turkmen claim extends Bivens to a “new 
context,” which the court held it did not.97 The test for a “new context” is 
whether the courts have recognized a Bivens remedy in cases with similar 
legal and factual components.98 The context of the claim in Turkmen is the 
confinement of the plaintiffs, subject to punitive conditions.99 This is a similar 
context to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 1979 in Carlson v. Green, in 
which the Court recognized a Bivens remedy under the Eighth Amendment 
for the overly harsh conditions of the plaintiff’s confinement.100 Other circuits 
have also permitted Bivens claims for unconstitutional conditions of confine-
ment.101 Although the Turkmen dissent argues otherwise, the Second Circuit 
adequately followed precedent as to conditions of confinement cases.102 The 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See infra notes 96–125 and accompanying text. 
 93 See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 105–118 and accompanying text. 
 95 See infra notes 119–125 and accompanying text. 
 96 See Corr. Servs. Corp v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001) (providing dicta as to the availa-
bility of a constitutional Bivens claim against a prison officer by a federal prisoner); Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–20 (1979) (applying a Bivens remedy for an Eighth Amendment condi-
tions of confinement claim); Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 235. 
 97 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 234; Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 572 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 98 See Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 272 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Arar, 585 F.3d at 
572). This depends on a medium level of generality and specificity as to context. Id. 
 99 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 235. 
 100 See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17–20. Additionally, in 2001, in Correctional Services Corpora-
tion v. Malesko, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated this Bivens context and recognized that a fed-
eral prisoner could have a remedy against federal officials for constitutional confinement claims. 
See 534 U.S. at 72. 
 101 See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 372–75 (3d Cir. 2012) (assuming that a Bivens remedy 
is available for plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment substantive due process and other constitutional 
claims challenging the conditions of his confinement); Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 947 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that federal courts can review a Bivens action alleging a prisoner’s violation of 
his substantive due process rights and that the prisoner’s allegations that a prison official planted 
drugs on him would be a constitutional violation). 
 102 See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 268 (Raggi, J., dissenting). The Turkmen dissent argues that the 
context of the case warrants a more specific, holistic examination of all legal and factual compo-
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dissent makes an overly fact specific inquiry into lack of medical care, which 
was one specific condition of confinement at issue in Carlson and Malesko, 
to argue that the conditions in Turkmen were in a “new context.”103 This is 
unreasonably specific as Carlson was also related to the conditions of con-
finement of detainees, but because the claim was brought under the Eighth 
Amendment, the plaintiff was required to show a higher standard of punitive 
intent than the plaintiffs who brought substantive due process and equal pro-
tection claims in Turkmen.104 
In response to the government’s post-9/11 policy, necessary litigation 
grew around the abuse of government power, which allowed a judicial reme-
dy to check such abuse, just as the Second Circuit did in Turkmen.105 Threat-
ening this check on governmental abuse, “national security” concerns arose 
as a limiting “special factor counseling hesitation” preventing the extension 
of a Bivens remedy.106 This is problematic because, in many national security 
cases, damages under Bivens are the only remedy to the constitutional wrong, 
which meets the second prong of the Bivens analysis that there are no alterna-
tive remedies available.107 The victims of the government’s post-9/11 abuses 
are often non-citizens and non-residents of the United States, so they do not 
have the political capital to defend their rights elsewhere.108 Even more, the 
                                                                                                                           
nents of the situation from which the claim arises, including the context of detainment occurring 
after the 9/11 attacks. See id. 
 103 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64–65 (alleging that the negligence of the correctional facility in 
giving the prisoner his medication necessitated a Bivens remedy); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 n.1 
(alleging that the failure of correctional facilities to give the prisoner adequate medical care 
amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation under Bivens); Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 269 (Raggi, J., 
dissenting). 
 104 See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16 n.1 (holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded an 
Eighth Amendment claim under Bivens). Compare Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) 
(establishing the Eighth Amendment standard for conditions of confinement cases for prisoners, 
requiring awareness and disregard of a risk to the safety of a prisoner), with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (establishing the substantive due process standard for conditions of confine-
ment cases for pretrial detainees, which is an inquiry into if the conditions are punitive in nature). 
 105 See Turkmen, 289 F.3d at 233; Schauer, supra note 32, at 1903–04 (describing the need for 
remedies, such as Bivens, to uphold constitutional precepts and to enforce compliance with such 
precepts); Vladeck, supra note 8, at 269 (utilizing Iqbal as the example of a case challenging the 
government’s actions in response to the 9/11 attacks). 
 106 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 269, 272. This categorization of “national security” as a 
“special factor counseling hesitation” has parallels to the political question doctrine, which some 
lower court judges have used as a separation of powers defense to refuse to hear constitutional 
claims. See Brown, supra note 25, at 845. This is incorrect because many of the cases that encom-
pass these so-called “political questions” are classic Bivens claims: claims based on federal offi-
cials’ alleged misconduct. See id. at 846. 
 107 See Kent, supra note 12, at 1143 (arguing that the fact that a Bivens remedy is the only 
remedy available for a constitutional violation does not mean that the Court should extend Bivens 
for that case). Often, individual suits will be the only option to challenge national policies engaged 
in on behalf of the war on terror. See Brown, supra note 25, at 847. 
 108 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 276 (describing that most victims of the government’s post-
9/11 violations have little political support). 
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political and social climate surrounding suspected terrorists in America would 
be unlikely to provided legislative remedies for them.109 A judicial remedy is 
necessary because Congress has no reason to provide a remedy, creating a 
hole in the rights afforded to those people affected by the post-9/11 policy.110 
In Turkmen, the Court properly turned the analysis on the context of the 
claim instead of the “special factors counseling hesitation,” and correctly pro-
vided a potential Bivens remedy for constitutional infringements on the rights 
of detainees to safe conditions.111 As to the concern that an expansion of 
Bivens will deter officials from taking action for national security for fear of 
personal liability, there are other means to protect officials who act reasona-
bly.112 It is likely that federal government officials will be protected by doc-
trines such as the “state secrets privilege,” “qualified immunity,” and “gov-
ernment indemnification,” as long as their actions are reasonable.113 These 
other doctrines serve as an initial cutoff, preventing the litigation of cases that 
would threaten legitimate government policy concerns.114 Other such doc-
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Process of Constitutional Change: From 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 518–19, 529 
(2006) (arguing that the 9/11 attacks changed the political motivations of the government toward 
counter-terrorism, resulting in the passage of the Patriot Act, which increased surveillance of the 
people); Howard Hom, The Immigration Landscape in the Aftermath of September 11, L.A. LAW., 
Sept. 2002, at 1, 23–24 (discussing the more restrictive and intrusive immigration and surveillance 
law reforms against non-citizens that were instituted in the interest of preventing and rooting out 
terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks); Vladeck, supra note 8, at 276 (describing why the 
politics of post-9/11 policies make a legislative remedy of constitutional violations stemming from 
these policies unlikely). 
 110 See Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 
9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 129, 134, 136–37, 139 (2013) (discussing the congressional re-
sponse to the 9/11 attacks, including the passage of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force and the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, which ultimately allowed for the deten-
tion of those with any perceived connection to the 9/11 attacks); Schauer, supra note 32, at 1903–
04 (describing the necessity of remedies like Bivens and other sanctions to keep government offi-
cials accountable to the law, including the Constitution); Vladeck, supra note 8, at 258 (describing 
why, in the absence of a congressional remedy, a judicial remedy will enable constitutional actions 
to continue in times of national security and will establish the parameters of constitutional federal 
action for other officials). 
 111 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71–72 (holding that a Bivens cause of action existed for condi-
tions in federal prison, but not private prisons); Carlson, 446 U.S at 16–19 (holding that a Bivens 
cause of action existed for the Eighth Amendment violations of prison officials who caused the 
plaintiff’s death because there were no special factors counseling hesitation and a judicial remedy 
was appropriate); Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 235, 237 & n.17 (holding that the conditions of confine-
ment claims stand in the well-known context of substantive due process claims brought by federal 
detainees facing harsh, punitive conditions while in federal facilities); Arar, 585 F.3d at 583 
(Packer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the complaint alleging mistreatment in U.S. detention facili-
ties did not bring the claim into a “new context” and that the majority mistakenly refused a Bivens 
remedy). 
 112 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 257–58. 
 113 Id. at 258. 
 114 See id. at 276. 
2016] Second Circuit Allows Bivens Action for Post-9/11 Detainment 209 
trines exist to do the work to protect national security actions, so Bivens 
claims will depend on the existence of adequate alternative remedies, not na-
tional security as an amorphous “special factor.”115 This enables the judicial 
branch to serve its role as an apolitical, impartial check on the other branches, 
especially when there are politically controversial national security issues 
present.116 This is the purpose of Bivens actions: to tender executive policy 
discretion with the limitations of constitutional rights and to hold executive 
officials accountable for harms to individuals’ rights.117 Utilizing national 
security as a “special factor” after 9/11 has stopped most recovery of damages 
in constitutional, counter-terrorism lawsuits, providing little opportunity for 
victim recovery.118  
Last, Turkmen justifies why qualified immunity should not serve as a 
catchall defense to Bivens liability just because federal policy purports to be 
in the national interest.119 Qualified immunity can be pled by a defendant to a 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (explaining that refusing the Attorney Gen-
eral absolute immunity still allowed him to proceed in addressing national security concerns with 
immunity, as long as he did not violate recognized law); Arar, 585 F.3d at 583, 610–11 (Parker, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that creating blanket immunity for federal actor violations relating to national 
security and foreign affairs undermines the role of the judiciary and that lawful qualified immunity 
and state secrets privilege are sufficient to protect national security); Vladeck, supra note 8, at 277 
(arguing that doctrines such as qualified immunity will protect lawful government action related to 
national security, so the concern for national security should not be the touchstone of Bivens 
claims). 
 116 See Brown, supra note 25, at 898 (arguing that Bivens actions can also serve as a check on 
the other branches in times of national security crisis). 
 117 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 272. The Second Circuit’s decision in Turkmen favoring 
individual rights may reflect a shift in national security jurisprudence away from traditional defer-
ence to the executive. See Geoffrey Stone, Civil Liberties v. National Security in the Law’s Open 
Areas, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1315, 1331, 1334 (2006) (arguing that the Court is no longer providing the 
same degree of deference to national security decisions over individual civil liberties and is more 
closely scrutinizing such decisions). Similarly, in 2004 in both Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. 
Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed the President’s actions based on the individual circum-
stances and rights affected, ultimately favoring individual rights over purported national security 
justifications. See Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37, 539 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466, 485 (2004); Stone, supra, at 1334. Recent habeas corpus decisions may suggest a great-
er judicial role in checking the policies engaged in by the executive in the war on terror, giving 
more weight to the protection of individual rights during national emergencies. See Brown, supra 
note 25, at 847, 894. 
 118 See Arar, 585 F.3d at 583 (Parker, J., dissenting) (arguing that “special factors” should 
give pause to the courts, but alone, do not determine whether a Bivens remedy is available because 
of countervailing interests); Vladeck, supra note 8, at 277–78 (arguing that the “special factors” 
analysis applied to claims against post-9/11 policies has been overly protective of federal offi-
cials). Thus, by restraining Bivens in the interest of national security, the court fails in one of its 
purposes to hold governments accountable for constitutional violations. See Editorial, A National 
Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/opinion/11wed1.html 
[https://perma.cc/M7KF-CR3H] (discussing the lack of a damages remedy in Arar). 
 119 Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 247, 251, 259, 262, 264 (holding that the defendants’ national secu-
rity motivations did not justify the violation of clearly established constitutional rights and barring 
qualified immunity). As Justice O’Connor stated in Hamdi, during times of war there must be a 
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Bivens action if the defendant can show that his or her conduct was reasona-
ble in the context or that the right violated was not clearly established at the 
time in question.120 Many cases involving national security and, specifically, 
the “war on terror,” include the violation of rights that were “clearly estab-
lished” at the time of the government action, so qualified immunity should 
not apply to them.121 The next step in looking at the allegedly violated right is 
to determine if it would be understandable to a reasonable official that his or 
her actions are violating the right, requiring a fact-specific inquiry that is not 
always possible in constitutional law.122 Constitutional decisions are often 
made based on generalizations of prior decisions, to allow for changing 
norms, but this generality makes the qualified immunity application incon-
sistent in terms of what is an established constitutional right and what is 
not.123 If there is no precisely narrowed precedent establishing a constitution-
al right on a certain set of facts, then qualified immunity will apply without 
regard to evolving constitutional violations and societal norms.124 This un-
dermines the very purpose of the Bivens remedy to protect and provide com-
pensation for violations of individual rights.125 
CONCLUSION 
At its core, Bivens liability reflects the need to protect individual rights 
and to keep federal government officials accountable for their actions, which 
is especially important during national security crises. Therefore, the Second 
                                                                                                                           
constitutional balance, but such balance must still give substantial weight to important constitu-
tional values like due process. 542 U.S. at 532. 
 120 See Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d, 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 121 See Brown, supra note 25, at 876 (explaining that some Bivens cases regarding the war on 
terror will survive motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity if the rights at issue are already 
established, but some cases will not survive because the rights at issue are not “apparent to a rea-
sonable official”). 
 122 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 
854 (2010) (describing the Supreme Court’s requirement that a law be “clearly established” to a 
degree that would give federal officials guidance in their day-to-day actions). 
 123 See id. at 855 (explaining that the Court’s constitutional opinions look at precedent 
through general standards, making a fact-specific standard difficult to establish). For example, in 
2010 in Fields v. Prater, the Fourth Circuit granted the defendants qualified immunity because the 
court could not determine with certainty whether the defendants were violating the plaintiff’s 
rights by refusing to hire her on the basis of her political affiliation. See 566 F.3d 381, 383, 385, 
390 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that the First Amendment did not permit party affiliation to be a fac-
tor for a hiring determination at a county department of social services, but qualified immunity 
still applied to the defendants). This was due to the court’s holding that the plaintiff’s right against 
political discrimination was not “clearly established” because the closest precedent was still dif-
ferentiated by the specific position at issue, Virginia director of social services. Id. at 390. Thus, it 
would appear that all that was lacking was a fact-specific prior Fourth Circuit decision applying 
political discrimination to this exact context. See id. 
 124 See Jeffries, supra note 122, at 856, 858. 
 125 See id. at 858. 
2016] Second Circuit Allows Bivens Action for Post-9/11 Detainment 211 
Circuit correctly decided Turkmen, holding high-ranking federal law en-
forcement officials accountable for constitutional violations resulting from a 
post-9/11 detainment policy. This may reflect a necessary shift in national 
security jurisprudence away from traditional deference to the executive to-
ward greater constitutional protection for individuals. 
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